Hastings Law Journal
Volume 19 | Issue 2

Article 16

1-1967

Trade Associations are Boycott-Prone--Bid
Depositories as a Case Study
William H. Orrick Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William H. Orrick Jr., Trade Associations are Boycott-Prone--Bid Depositories as a Case Study, 19 Hastings L.J. 505 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol19/iss2/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS ARE BOYCOTT-PRONE-BID DEPOSITORIES AS A CASE STUDY
By WILiLAm H. OpiCK, JiR.*
THERE is nothing permanent except change." This summary of
the basic philosophy of Heraclitus' is the hallmark of the modern bus-

iness world. The ever-increasing acceleration of the rate of change
in the technology and methods of doing business in this computerized
space age has been a primary cause of the spawning of an everincreasing number of trade associations. 2 These new trade associations have been founded largely because of the members' desire and
necessity for learning the new technology and the new methods.3 The
same cause has resulted in the increased use and rejuvenation of existing trade associations.
Thus, today it is more important than ever, in a business world
in which there are also changes in antitrust theory and enforcement,
for businessmen who are members of trade associations and trade
association executives to understand fully the antitrust principles
applicable to modern trade associations and to know what they, as
members and executives of trade associations, can and cannot do
under the law.
But why, it may be asked, must the legality of trade association
activities be measured by the sometimes unstable and imprecise yardstick of antitrust principles? It was not always so.
Since the time of the Pharaohs in Egypt, the early emperors in
China and the Phoenicians in the Mediterranean, businessmen
have banded together in so-called trade associations to help each other
without having to worry about the antitrust laws.4 Literally,
* Member, California Bar; former Assistant U.S. Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division. The author wishes to express his appreciation to his associate, Ralph C. Walker, a member of the California Bar, for
his assistance in preparation of this article.
1 A. ROGERS, STUDENT'S HISTORY OF PmLOSOPHY 126 (3d ed. 1952). Put

another way by de Tocqueville: "America is a land of wonders, in which
everything is in constant motion and every change seems an improvement."
I.A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMiOcRAcY IN AMERICA 33 (12th ed. 1956).
2 A trade association is commonly defined as a "nonprofit voluntary
cooperative organization of business competitors." Brass, The Antitrust Division Looks at Trade Associations, 30 J.B.A.D.C. 287 (1963).
3 Small Business Administrator Bernard L. Boutin underscored the
problem when in testimony before a Congressional Committee he said: "The
small business man is being left behind in America's booming economy. He
is caught in a crossfire." The Oil Daily, Mar. 6, 1967, at 7, col. 1.
4 CHAMER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES, AssocIATIoN MANAGEMENT
2 (1958).
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for centuries they have been in the center of the stream of business
history and have flourished as an integral part of the capitalistic
system.
And, in the United States, trade associations, far from being something new or an innovation to circumvent the antitrust laws, had
their genesis before the American Revolution.5 The two oldest
American trade associations, namely, the Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York, founded in 1768, and the New York Stock Exchange, founded in 1792, continue to be important trade associations
today. Indeed, throughout the history of American business, trade
associations have been of inestimable value not only to their members
but to our whole society. During World War I and World War HI they
provided an important source of vital statistics for the United States
Government covering the rate and extent of production of various
7
goods and machinery.
Today, modern trade associations play a far larger and more
important business role in the capitalistic community than those
extant even 10, 15 or 25 years ago, let alone their more ancient counterparts. They provide such valuable services for their members as
accounting services, suggestions for better business practices, credit
information, collection services, economic studies, engineering aids
and services, governmental relations, industrial relations, legislative
research, legal information, liaisons with governmental agencies,
market research, public relations, quality control and research, sales
promotion, trade practice studies and many other services.8
Antitrust as the Regulator of Trade Association Activities
Why then circumscribe trade association activities by the application of the antitrust yardstick? The answer is very simple. The
outstanding characteristic of a trade association is that it is a combination of business competitors. 9 This very important fact-that it
is a combination-brings a trade association squarely within one
major element of two of the most important antitrust laws, namely,
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 10 Section 1 proscribes every
contract, combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade, and section 2 proscribes every combination or conspiracy to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce of the United States." A trade associa5 Id. at 2-3.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Id. at 5-6; G.

TICE

LAam & S. KITTELLE, TRADE AssocIATiox LAW Aw PRAcLAmB & KITELLE].

7-8, 12 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
8 LAMB & KITTELE 31-168.
9 See note 2 supra.

10 15

11 Id.

U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
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tion, being a combination of businessmen and business organizations,
in proving a violation of secthen meets one very important element
2
tion I or section 2 of the Sherman Act.1
The very fact of being one member of a formal combination of
competitors makes it much simpler to run afoul of the antitrust rules
proscribing joint action in so many areas. During the days when the
National Industrial Recovery Act was in full force and effect, trade
associations formed the nucleus of the groups that developed and enforced the codes of fair competition. Their members and executives
thus became skilled in ways of restraining competition and in ways
trade or industry
of enforcing recalcitrant members of a particular
13
to abide by the so-called codes of fair competition.
It is important at the outset to emphasize that mere membership
in a trade association does not violate any statute. There is no such
thing as guilt by membership.14 And, thus, mere membership in an
association which is engaged in a conspiracy to violate the antitrust
laws is not sufficient to establish participation in the conspiracy. It
has, however, been held that a member who knows or should know
that his association is engaged in an unlawful conspiracy, and who
continues his membership without protest, may very well be charged
with conspiracy.' 5
Trade associations, for the most part, 6 have long since ceased
12 It may be here noted that the anticompetitive dangers inherent in a
combination of competitors have been recognized since the earliest days of

the guilds and other combinations of merchants and craftsmen in medieval
England. In a 5-year flurry of vigorous "antitrust" enforcement, associations
of coopers, skinners, chandlers, fruiters, carpenters and cordwainers were
prosecuted for combinations in restraint of trade in London from 1298 to
1303. Hence, application of statutory and common law rules against restraint
of trade to such activity is certainly nothing new. Peppin, Price-Fixing
Agreements Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 310-11
nn.43, 44 (1940).
1 G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FRnE ENTERPRISE 233 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as STOCKING &

WATKINS].

14 Boyle v. United States, 40 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 282 U.S. 857
(1930); cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964).
3. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1943).
16 1 say "for the most part" advisedly since on January 26, 1967, the
Fuel Oil Dealers' Division of the Central Montgomery County Chamber of
Commerce, described as "a trade association whose members are fuel oil
dealers," was indicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, along with ten
individuals and six companies, and was charged with illegally raising and
fixing the prices of fuel oil in Norristown, Pennsylvania (United States v.
Fuel Oil Dealers' Division, Crim. No. 22756 (E.D. Pa.)); on March 8, 1967, a
proposed consent judgment was filed ending a civil antitrust case against the
Chicago Linen Supply Association and 12 of its members. The judgment required that the association be dissolved and the defendants enjoined from
stabilizing prices and allocating markets for customers (United States v.
Chicago Linen Supply Ass'n, 296 B.N.A., ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION
REPORTS, A-4 (Mar. 14, 1967)); and on November 24, 1967, a civil antitrust
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being the vehicle by which various and sundry methods of unreasonably restraining trade resulted in per se law violations. Through
bitter experience, trade association executives learned early in the
history of the Sherman Act that one could not do through membership
in a trade association what he was forbidden to do without being a
member of a trade association. The experience came from cases which
established the guideposts for trade association activities and now
serve as reminders of activities in which trade associations and their
members may not participate. The case history of trade associations
in the antitrust laws indicates that these associations can be used to
accomplish nearly all the known antitrust offenses,' 7 beginning with
price-fixing.
Price-fixing specifically is mentioned here because not only is it
the most common antitrust violation, but it is an excellent example
of an offense which can be easily accomplished through a trade association. Price-fixing is, of course, illegal per se, no matter how accomplished.' 8 In United States v. Gasoline Retailers Association,
Inc.,19 a gasoline retailers association was indicted and convicted for
entering into a specific agreement with a union local to refrain from
advertising the price of retail sales of gasoline in any manner other
than the price computing mechanism attached to gasoline pumps; and
in United States v. Greater Washington Service Stations Association,
Inc.,20 another gasoline retailers association was indicted and convicted for price-fixing accomplished by the adoption by a trade association of a minimum price schedule. There the members of the association agreed to compile, publish and distribute a schedule of minimum automotive service charges. And, of course, price-fixing can be
suit was filed in the federal district court in Milwaukee charging the National
Funeral Directors Association with coercing undertakers to prevent them
from advertising prices of funerals. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 27, 1967, at 10,
col. 1-2.
17 E.g., price-fixing, allocation of production, allocation of resources,
suppression of products and patent misuse, division of markets, boycotts,
price discrimination and rebating, tie-ins, exclusive dealing, and anticompetitive mergers or acquisitions. See generally, LAMB & KITTELLE 31-168;
STOCKING & WATINs 231-55; 2 S. WHrNEy, ANTITRUST PoLIcims 412-15 (1958);
Symposium-Trade Associations, 1955 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 9-99; Withrow, Trade Associations, 4 ANTiTR ST BULL. 173 (1959).
18 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
'9 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961). Four recent cases involving price-fixing
by agreements among members of associations of pharmacists upon a minimum schedule of prices for prescription drugs are as follows: Northern
California Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n,
201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah 1962); United States v. Idaho State Pharmaceutical
Ass'n, Civil No. 3654 (D. Idaho 1963); United States v. Hawaii Retail Drug
Ass'n, Civil No. 2064 (D. Hawaii 1963).
20 1962 Trade Cas. f 70,372 (D.D.C. 1962).
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accomplished (and proven) by an acceptance, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a trade-restraining plan,21 or
by a simultaneous price increase by industry leaders at a time when
sales are declining, even without evidence of any communications
among the participants, 22 or by industry-wide adoption of identical
price formulae,23 or perhaps even by a "knowing wink."2 4 Trade
associations, by their very nature, form an excellent vehicle for pricefixing by any of the methods above mentioned.
But the history of trade associations is not simply written in
negative terms. There are many permissible trade association activities sanctioned by the highest courts. Indeed, the so-called Magna
Charta of trade associations (Mr. Justice Stone's oft-quoted Maple
Flooring25 opinion) bears the imprimatur of the Supreme Court itself,
as follows:
It was not the purpose or the intent of the Sherman Anti-trust Law
to inhibit the intelligent conduct of business operations, nor do we
conceive that its purpose was to suppress such influences as might
affect the operations of interstate commerce through the application
to them of the individual intelligence of those engaged in commerce,
enlightened by accurate information as to the essential elements of
the economics of a trade or business, however gathered or disseminated. Persons who unite in gathering and disseminating information in trade journals and statistical reports on industry, who gather
and publish statistics as to the amount of production of commodities
in interstate commerce, and who report market prices, are not engaged in unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade merely because
the ultimate result of their efforts may be to stabilize prices or limit
production through a better understanding of economic laws and a
more general ability to conform to them, for the simple reason that
the Sherman law neither repeals economic2 6 laws nor prohibits the
gathering and dissemination of information.
It is under the umbrella of this opinion that statistical reporting,
cost accounting and other important services are frequently rendered
by modern trade associations 2 7 Some of these services shall be
examined briefly.
Statistical Reporting
Statistical reporting has received much attention from the
courts.28 Collecting, classifying, compiling and distributing data,
21 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
22 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
23 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
24 Cf. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965).
25 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
26 Id. at 583-84.
27 CHA.BER OF COiMERCE OF UNITED STATES,

17-18 (1958); 2 S.WHmNE,
WATx Ns 233-34.
28

ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT

ANTITRUsT PoLIcIES 413-14 (1958); STOCKING &

See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925);
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primarily nonprice data such as figures on production, orders, sales,
capacity, shipments and stocks on hand, are some of the most important trade association activities. 29 Industry's requirements for
statistics are endless, and the best way to meet these requirements is
through planned collection and distribution activities by trade associations.
The gathering of such statistics with reference to price data has
received close scrutiny, particularly in the Maple Flooring,30 Hardwood Lumber 31 and Linseed Oil32 cases.

The general rule of thumb

applicable to collecting such price data is derived from the holding
in Maple Flooring,where the Court said:
It is the consensus of opinion of economists and of many of the most
important agencies of government that the public interest is served
by the gathering and dissemination . . . of information with respect

to the production and distribution, cost and prices in actual sales, of
market commodities because the making available of such information tends to stabilize trade and industry, to produce fairer price
levels and to avoid the waste which inevitably attends the unintelligent conduct of economic enterprise . .

. .33

In Hardwood Lumber, the Court pointed out that an arrangement in which harmony on future prices was expected, clearly violated the Sherman Act, and it commented that:
Genuine competitors do not make daily, weekly and monthly reports
of the minutest details of their business to their rivals as the defend-

ants did.S4

Similarly, in Linseed Oil,3 r the Court found that the program
there involved, although purporting to foster "intelligent competition," did not provide for "real competition."3 6 Other guidelines for
statistical reporting which have received judicial approval are contained in the First Cement case,3

7

Sugar Institute,38

and finally in

39

Tag ManufacturersInstitute.

The most recent judicial expression on the legality of reporting
is expected from the district court in United States v. Container
Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Tag Mfrs.
Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949).
29 Cf. LAmB & KITTELLE 30-33.
30 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
31

American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).

32

United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-83

33

(1925).
34

American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410

(1921).
35 United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).

Id. at 388-90.
Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
38 Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
89 Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949).
36
37
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40
Corporation,
which was argued January 12, 1967. There the 18 defendants had a continuing agreement to exchange information concerning prices which were charged specific customers. The court
has yet to rule on this type of statistical reporting.
In summary, statistical reporting is useful and necessary in the
modern day business world. The test as to whether or not it is illegal
inevitably is what is the purpose of submitting the information. That
is the single most important criterion.

Cost Accounting
Another important trade association activity is cost accounting.
Like certain other activities, it is not illegal in and of itself, provided
that it is not used for illegal purposes or in conjunction with some
arrangement that violates the antitrust laws. This activity also received judicial approval in Maple Flooring,41 where the members had
reported over a period of time their costs of labor, warehousing insurance, taxes, interest, selling and advertising. Cost accounting
can, of course, be used as a price-fixing scheme, as in United Typothetae,42 in which a "standard guide" dealing with uniform cost accounting principles and average-cost analysis was in reality a recommended price list. On the other hand, in Vitrified China,43 the FTC
found there was no intent to fix final selling prices. In this case the
average-cost study was held not part of a price conspiracy, in spite of
the fact that the survey had been undertaken to enable manufacturers
"to bring up the items which were priced too low and to bring down
44
the items too high in relation to the actual costs of production."
Credit Reporting and Combined Buying
Activities to enable members to evaluate credit risks among
their customers are a trade association function which received judicial sanction in the First Cement case. 45 Again, credit reporting
cannot, of course, be used as part of an illegal scheme. And so, in
Swift & Co. v. United States, 46 uniform rules for the giving of credit
to dealers, keeping a blacklist of delinquents and refusing to sell meat
to them was found to be part of an overall price-fixing arrangement,
and held illegal.
Combined buying is an activity of trade associations which must
be very carefully reviewed indeed, to be sure that section 2 of the
40

Civil No. C 180-G-63 (M.D.N.C., filed Oct. 14, 1963).

41
42
43
44
45
46

Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925).
FTC v. United Typothetae of America, 6 F.T.C. 345 (1923).
Vitrified China Ass'n, 49 F.T.C. 1571 (1953).
Id. at 1573.
Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act 47 is not vio48

lated.

Standard-Wriing
The recent controversy over automobile safety standards, culminating in the action filed by the automobile industry March 30, 1967
against the government, 49 and the recent speeches by the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, 50 have focused attention upon the trade association
activity related to standardization of product. Standardization of
product, of course, can be a part of a price-fixing conspiracy. 51
As Assistant Attorney General Turner has pointed out, there
are some 300 standards-writing organizations in the United States
which have developed more than 13,600 standards and "no serious
criticism can be directed at the private formulation of standards designed to reduce clearly excessive and pointless proliferation of prod'52
uct variety.
Standards have been used, however, to facilitate noncompetitive
53
pricing.
Industry-Government Relationships
It is in the field of influencing legislation that trade association
activities are most effective. That such activities are entirely legal
has been settled beyond doubt by the Supreme Court holding that
concerted activity to influence the passage or enforcement of legislation by a trade association in one industry, even though primarily
motivated by predatory intent toward another industry, did not violate the antitrust laws.5 4

Thus, in trying to bring to the attention of the government problems involved in the Kennedy round of negotiations and in trying to
have inserted appropriate provisions with respect to dumping and
47

Clayton Act § 2,ch. 25, § 2, 38 Stat. 631 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.

§ 13 (1964).

48 Quality Bakers of America v.FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940). See
also General Auto Supplies, Inc. v.FTC,346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965).
49 Wall Street Journal, April 3,1967, at 2,col. 3-4.
50 Address by Assistant Attorney General Donald F. Turner, Annual
Meeting of Antitrust Section of New York State Bar Assn, Jan. 26, 1967;
address by Mr.Turner, Fifth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago,
Illinois, October 13, 1966.
51 Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946).
52 Note 50 supra.
53 C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.
1952).
54 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961).
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escape clauses and export licensing, trade associations are very effective indeed. 55
Perhaps one of the most effective demonstrations of trade association activity is the concerted activity of many trade associations to
defeat the repeal of section 14B in the Taft-Hartley Act,56 and also
57
to keep down the provisions in the minimum wage statute.
Research and Invention
Trade association activity in the field of joint research has likewise received judicial sanction through the Supreme Court dictum
in United States v. Line Material Co.,58 and so, to some extent, have
patent ownership and patent interchange. 59
The foregoing services are useful and important services rendered
by trade associations which are fully subject to the antitrust laws.
Two particular types of trade associations which are not in all
respects subject to the antitrust laws are a Webb-Pomerene association and an agricultural cooperative association.
A Webb-Pomerene association 6° is exempt from the Sherman
Act insofar as acts, combinations and agreements relating to export
trade are concerned; but the activity of an association of this type
may not be such as to restrain trade within the United States, nor
may an exempt association restrain trade among its domestic competitors or intentionally affect prices within the United States. 61 Because of the limited permissible goals of such an association, the discussions herein regarding permissible and nonpermissible trade association activity are not as pertinent as they hopefully are to a typical domestic trade association, but nevertheless the very narrow
scope of activities available to a Webb-Pomerene association requires
careful adherence to the guidelines of lawful activity, lest the exemption be lost. It seems clear, for example, that a Webb-Pomerene
association could not enforce a boycott of a particular common carrier,
62
wharfinger, manufacturer or processor.
Similarly, some of the activities of an agricultural cooperative
55 Address by Ambassador William MKRoth, World Affairs Council, Oct.
23, 1967, San Francisco.
56 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(b) (1965).
57 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (Supp. 1966).
58

333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948).

50 Cf. Standard Sanitary Mg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1921);
Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 179 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.
1949); Davis Co. v. Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 180
(M.D.N.C. 1949).
60 That is, an association formed under the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964), and engaged solely in export trade.
61 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1964).
62 Cf. LAzsm & KrIL=LE 121-31.
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association are exempt from the antitrust laws under the CapperVolstead Act 63 and section 6 of the Clayton Act. 64 However, the exemption for agricultural cooperatives is a narrow one, relating primarily to the formation, organization and operation of the cooperatives
within the purpose of the granted exemption. Hence, while a common
selling agency for competitors is a probable violation of the Sherman
Act, 65 agricultural cooperatives are specifically enabled to form or
employ such selling agents. 66 Other activity furthering the purpose
of the exemptions is permissible, such as financial assistance to members, agricultural marketing agreements with the Secretary of Agriculture,6 7 formation of federations of cooperatives, 6 8 and horizontal
mergers. 69 However, once an agricultural cooperative is formed and
71
operating, it is subject to antitrust attack for price-fixing, 70 boycotts,
price discrimination 72 and attempts to monopolize 73 just as much as
63 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1964).
04 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
65

O'Halloran v. American Sea Green Slate Co., 207 F. 187 (N.D.N.Y.

1913), rev'd on other grounds, 229 F. 77 (2d Cir. 1915); Continental Wall
Paper Co. v. Lewis Voight & Sons Co., 148 F. 939 (6th Cir. 1906); Ellis v.
Inman, Poulsen & Co., 131 F. 182 (9th Cir. 1904); Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co.
v. United States, 115 F. 610 (6th Cir. 1902).
66 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1964).
67 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-59
(1964).
68

Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S.

19 (1962).
69 Macntyre, Cooperatives, 26 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 125 (1964);
Saunders, The Status of Agricultural Cooperatives Under the Antitrust Laws,
20 FF. B.J. 35, 54 (1960); Comment, 43 NEB. L. REv. 73, 96 (1963); Note, 36
IND. L.J. 497, 507-0& (1961).
In a recent speech the Assistant Attorney
General said: "[W]hile mergers between cooperative and non-cooperative
organizations are fully subject to the antitrust laws, somewhat different standards may be used in judging mergers between cooperatives. In particular,
as a cooperative appears to be entitled to acquire some degree of market
power simply by enrolling new members in its organization,it should have
the right to acquire this same power through horizontal merger when the
merger is identical for all practical purposes to an increase in the size of
one of the cooperatives through the voluntary accession of new members.
Thus, if at the time a meger [sic] between cooperatives is to take place each
member of the cooperative is free to withdraw and to be reimbursed the
value of his share in the organization, the merger seems equivalent to the
voluntary enrollment of new members into the organization and as such no
more subject to attack under the antitrust laws than that organization would
be if it had enlisted the same members originally." Address by Donald F.
Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, National Conference of Fruit and
Vegetable Bargaining Cooperatives, in Washington, D.C., Jan. 17, 1966, reprinted in THE COOPERATIVE ACCOUNTANT, Summer 1966, at 22, 28 (emphasis
added).
70 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
71 Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S.
458 (1960).
72 Cf. id. at 472.
73 North Texas Producers Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189
(5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966).

January 1968]

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS

any other business.

Boycott by Trade Associations
We turn now to the antitrust violation most easily accomplished
through the use of a trade association-a boycott. 74 So far as legal
writing is concerned, this is the most ignored trade association activ-

Boycotts are illegal per se.76 They are used by trade associations most frequently to coerce members or nonmembers to follow,
ity. 75

or not to follow, a particular plan of action, and when challenged, in
most instances have been declared illegal. Thus, trade associations
cannot exclude competitors from membership, 77 nor can they attempt
to coerce, either directly or indirectly, competitors to become members.78 Indeed, such associations have been required by the courts
to make their services available to members upon reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms,79 and to admit to membership qualified applicants upon nondiscriminatory terms and conditions.8 0 By the same
token, a trade association cannot expel its members for the purpose
of carrying out an illegal plan or agreement, 8 ' or require its members
74

An activity named for a victim, Capt. Charles C. Boycott, an English

land agent ostracized in County Mayo, Ireland, for refusing to reduce rents.
MERRIAm-WEBsTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 321 (2d ed. 1951).
75 See, e.g., the emphasis in price-fixing and other related activities

in

Dunkelberger, The Lawyer's Role in Advising the Trade Association, 10
ANTITRUST BULL. 583 (1965); Melvin, What Every Lawyer Should Know
About Trade Association Law and Practice,53 ILm. B.J. 114 (1964); Brass, The

Antitrust Division Looks at Trade Associations, 30 J.B.A.D.C. 287 (1963);
Wilson, The Federal Trade Commission Looks at Trade Associations, 30
J.B.A.D.C. 297 (1963); MacNee, The FTC and Trade Association Statistics, 7
ANTITRUST BULL. 753 (1962).

Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
On March 29, 1967, the Justice Department filed a civil antitrust suit
in Des Moines, Iowa, charging the National Farmers Organization with
76

77
78

"threatening, intimidating, harassing and committing acts of violence" in
attempting to force nonmember farmers, truckers and processors to join the

organization's campaign to keep milk off the market. The suit charged the
NFO with attempting to monopolize the interstate sale of milk in 19 states.
United States v. National Farmers Organization, Civ. No. 1-273-S (S.D. Iowa,
Mar. 29, 1967).
79 United States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 1955 Trade Cas.
67,993 (E.D. Mich.

1954).
80 United States v. New Jersey Auto Glass Dealers' Ass'n, 1960 Trade
Cas. 69,764 (D.N.J. 1960); United States v. American Ass'n of Advertising
68,330 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v.
Agencies, Inc., 1956 Trade Cas.
National Wrestling Alliance, 1956 Trade Cas. 1 68,507 (S.D. Iowa 1956);
United States v. Lowell Fuel Oil Dealer Associates, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas.
68,090 (D. Mass. 1955); United States v. Lawrence Fuel Oil Institute, Inc.,
68,075 (D. Mass. 1955); United States v. R.L. Polk & Co.,
1955 Trade Cas.

1955 Trade Cas. 67,993 (E.D. Mich. 1954); United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 1953 Trade Cas. f 67,510 (N.D. Ohio 1953); United States v. Allied
Florists Ass'n, 1953 Trade Cas. 67,433 (N.D. IlM. 1953).
81 United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703

cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940).

(D.C. Cir.),
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to adhere to so-called fair codes of competition.82
However, an association may exclude from membership persons
not within the trade group represented by the association, 3 and indeed may well be prohibited from admitting to membership persons
not actually within the trade group represented and whose membership may have anticompetitive effects, as might result from membership of a supplier in a fabricators, jobbers or retailers association. 4
Trade associations are prohibited from compelling their members
to conduct their business in a particular fashion. For example, a jobbers association, by argument, persuasion and promises of increased
patronage, could not prevent competition from manufacturers who
sell directly to retailers and large consumers. 85 Nor can trade associations prevent their members from engaging in a particular busi86
ness.
Enforcing anticompetitive agreements by forfeiting pecuniary deposits for infractions of the agreement is illegal, 87 as is the method
of enforcing such an agreement by means of penalties and fines. 88
Industrywide self-regulation is often attempted by the use of
trade associations. Such self-regulation, no matter how high the mo80
tive, is often very dangerous.
Many antitrust cases contain a defense, convincing or not, that
the asserted violations were undertaken to prevent cutthroat competi82 United States v. Abrasive Grain Ass'n, 1948 Trade Cas. 1162,329
(W.D.N.Y. 1948).
83 United States v. Southern Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 207 F. 434 (N.D.
Ala. 1913).
84 United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 1953 Trade Cas. 7f 67,510 (N.D.
Ohio 1953); United States v. National Ass'n of Printers' Roller Mfrs., 1953
Trade Cas. 7f 67,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v. Association of Am.
Battery Mfrs., 1953 Trade Cas. 7 67,631 (W.D. Mo. 1953); cf. United States
v. National Audio-Visual Ass'n, 1957 Trade Cas. 7f 68,833 (E.D. Va. 1957);
United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 1954 Trade Cas. 7f 67,828 (D.R.L
1954); United States v. United Fruit Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
68,941 (E.D. La.
1958); United States v. Maryland State Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 1958 Trade
Cas. 77ff 69,142, 69,213 (D. Md. 1958); Brass, supra note 78.
85 Pacific State Paper Trade Ass'n v. FTC, 4 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1925).
86 United States v. Baton Rouge Ins. Exch., 1958 Trade Cas. 7f 69,068
(E.D. La. 1958).
87 United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
88 United States v. Diamond Dealers Club, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas.
67,987
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Coal Dealers' Ass'n, 85 F. 252 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1898); United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal & Coke Co., 46 F. 432 (C.C.M.D.
Tenn. 1891).
89 "There are approximately forty organizations composed of producers,
distributors or sellers in a particular industry which have adopted some type
of program for self-regulation in advertising." Developments in the LawDeceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1142 (1967). Attempts to establish codes of ethical practices, advisory panels, product testing and certification programs, and code authority, such as the motion picture code and the
cigarette advertising code, have been attempted. Id. at 1143-51.
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tion, or to eliminate undesirable practices in a particular industry, or
to safeguard the public health and safety, or that such violations are
otherwise nevertheless in the public interest. Such defenses seldom
withstand close analysis, and even more seldom do they prevail. 0
Boycotts to restrict price competition were held unlawful as early
as 1914. 91 The status of concerted activity to eliminate undesirable
or "unethical" industry practices not directly related to pricing, however, was somewhat in doubt until 1941. Then the Supreme Court
held in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC92 that,
despite the presumed beneficial purpose of eliminating style piracy,
nevertheless it violates the antitrust laws for a group of private persons to band together to enforce rules upon one another, when
those rules do not have the sanction of law. The principle was reaffirmed with vigor in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,93 in
which a unanimous court held it unlawful for a combination of manufacturers and retailers to boycott another retailer, even when there
was no damage done to the public. And again, in United States v.
General Motors Corp., 94 the Court reiterated this sound premise, and
stated:
Exclusion of traders from the market by means of combination or
conspiracy is so inconsistent with the free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not to be saved by reference to
...the allegedly tortious conduct against which a combination or
conspiracy may be directed .... 95
Even where the purpose of the private joint action is to afford
protection to consumers, it is unlawful.9 6 In Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co.,97 the plaintiff charged an unlawful
combination to exclude from the market gas appliances not receiving
a seal of approval from the testing laboratories of the American Gas
Association. As a result, the utilities refused to provide gas for use
in equipment which did not bear the seal of approval. The Supreme
Court again unanimously held that the collective refusal to supply
90 Cf. The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 200-03 (1959);
Note, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 385-87 (1959).
91 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600 (1914).
92 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
93 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
94 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
95 Id. at 146.
96 In Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912),
the Court held it unlawful for a group of manufacturers of enamelware to
"protect" the consumer from having to purchase bathroom fixtures and other
enamelware which was not of the highest quality. This was an attempt to
afford consumers the opportunity to purchase better products than some of
them had been purchasing in the past.
97 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
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into the category of restraints
gas for use in the plaintiff's burners fell
98
that are unlawful in and of themselves.
Few of the defenses based on the premise that the public interest is nevertheless served by anticompetitive activity of the boycott nature have any merit, and this is true even if the extra mantle of
religious dictates is added to the cloak of "public good." 99
It seems safe to generalize from the above-cited authorities that a
trade association, no matter what its reasons and no matter what
its type, may not lawfully participate in or effect a boycott of another.
With all of the foregoing examples of illegal boycotts on the
books, it is a wonder that misuse by trade associations of the power
to boycott should continue. But, despite the plethora of cases outlawing the use of the power, many of which have resulted in the dissolution of the association involved, 00 and despite the warnings of
98 The Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division
has recently emphasized the great skepticism with which his Division views
justifications of anticompetitive activities by virtue of protecting the public
safety. Address by Assistant Attorney General Donald F. Turner, Annual
Meeting of Antitrust Law Section of New York State Bar Ass'n, New York
City, Jan. 26, 1967; address by Mr. Turner, Fifth Annual Corporate Counsel
Institute, Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 13, 1966.
99 United States v. Kosher Butchers' Ass'n, 1955 Trade Cas. [ 67,988
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
100 United States v. Chicago Linen Supply Ass'n, Civ. No. 66 C 1652 (N.D.
Ill.), final judgment entered April 18, 1967 [cited in CCH, THE FE Rz1AL
ANTITRUST LAWS WITH SUMMARY OF CASES INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED STATES

1890-1951 (with supplements thereto). Henceforth, cases contained therein
will sometimes be referred to as "Blue Book No. __"; the year in parentheses indicates the year in which dissolution was ordered.] See also, United
States v. Philadelphia Ass'n of Linen Suppliers, Blue Book No. 1783 (1964);
United States v. Connecticut Package Stores Ass'n, Blue Book No. 1646
(1963); United States v. Nassau & Suffolk County Retail Hardware Ass'n,
Blue Book No. 1346 (1959); United States v. Fur Shearers Guild, Inc., Blue
Book No. 1428 (1959); United States v. Philadelphia Radio & Television
Broadcasting Ass'n, Blue Book No. 1300 (1958); United States v. Greater New
York Food Processors Ass'n, Blue Book No. 1382 (1958); United States v.
Concrete Form Ass'n, Blue Book No. 1324 (1958); United States v. Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'ns, Blue Book No. 1248 (1957); United States v. Garden
State Retail Gasoline Dealers Ass'n, Blue Book No. 1239 (1956); United States
v. Memphis Retail Package Stores Ass'n, Blue Book No. 1246 (1956); United
States v. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n, Blue Book Nos. 1070, 1080
(1955); United States v. Detroit Sheet Metal & Roofing Contractors Ass'n,
Blue Book No. 1153 (1955); United States v. National Ass'n of Printers Roller
Mfrs., Inc., Blue Book No. 1087 (1953); United States v. Allied Florists Ass'n,
Blue Book No. 1108 (1953); United States v. Grinding Wheel Mfrs. Ass'n,
Blue Book No. 889 (1947); United States v. Market Truckmen's Ass'n, Blue
Book No. 819 (1945); United States v. Produce Exchange, Blue Book No. 739
(1942); United States v. Washington Wholesale Grocers Ass'n, Blue Book No.
723 (1942); United States v. Retail Lumbermen's Ass'n, Blue Book No. 651
(1941); United States v. Excavators Administrative Ass'n, Blue Book No. 478
(1939); United States v. Union Painters Administrative Ass'n, Blue Book No.
477 (1939); United States v. Plumbing & Heating Industries Administrative
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the Supreme Court in Fashion Originators' Guild in 1941, in Klor's

in 1959, and most recently in General Motors in 1966, and the warnings of the nation's principal antitrust enforcer in two recent
speeches,' 0 ' many trade associations continue to violate the federal
antitrust laws-and in the instances mentioned below, the applicable
state laws-by continuing to use, or rather misuse, the boycott power.
As a startling example of the extent to which trade associations continue to employ their considerable boycott power, we shall examine
a particular industry-the construction industry-and a particular
institution of that industry, the bid depository.
Bid Depositories-Example of Boycott-Prone

Trade Associations
Trade associations abound in the construction industry; there are
associations of general contractors, subcontractors, suppliers of materials and combinations of the foregoing. Although there are a few
giant general contractors and subcontractors, and many large materials suppliers, this industry nevertheless is predominantly made up
of small businessmen, upon whom advanced technology and marked
business cycles have great impact. Hence, the trade associations
found in the construction industry face many of the same problems, provide many of the same functions, and are just as susceptible
to use as tools of boycott as are trade associations in other industries.
What singles out the construction industry, making it worth a special
study, is the tenacity with which one particular form of institutionalized boycott-the bid depository-has persisted.
Bid depositories are nothing new to antitrust law enforcement.
During the last 25 years the Department of Justice has proceeded
civilly, criminally, or both, against 29 bid depositories involved in
practices or agreements of price-fixing, bid rigging, allocating markets
or customers, and of boycotting or otherwise conspiring against or
with competitors, suppliers, customers or labor groups in restraint of
trade. 0 2 All of the cases showed elements of coercion or boycotts
Ass'n, Blue Book No. 476 (1939); United States v. Voluntary Code of Heating,
Piping & Air Conditioning Industry, Blue Book No. 468 (1939); United States
v. Bolt, Nut & Rivet Mfrs. Ass'n, Blue Book No. 378 (1931); United States v.

Maine Co-Operative Sardine Co., Blue Book No. 329 (1927); United States
v. Flower Producers Cooperative Ass'n, Blue Book No. 307 (1926); United
States v. Seattle Produce Ass'n, Blue Book No. 289 (1925); United States v.
Tile Mfrs. Credit Ass'n, Blue Book No. 248 (1923); United States v. Barbers'
Supply Dealers Ass'n of America, Blue Book No. 214 (1920); United States
v. Grant F. Discher, Blue Book No. 193 (1917).
101 Addresses by Donald F. Turner, supra note 98.
102 See generally CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS WIT SUMMARY Or
CASES INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED STATEs

1890-1951 (1952), with supplements

thereto; cf. Schueller, Bid Depositories, 58 MicH. L. REV. 497, 506 (1960).
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against competitors of the parties interested in the depository plan.
The depositories were either compulsory or exclusionary. 103 In either
case, the freedom of competitive action of independent businessmen
was restricted. For full understanding of the anticompetitive impact
of bid depositories, a description of a typical depository's organization
and operation is necessary. No attempt is made to deal with pricefixing, bid-rigging or market allocation activities.
A typical bid depository is a facility established and operated by
a trade association of construction subcontractors, which receives bids
from the subcontractors for the supplying of construction services
or supplies and presents those bids en masse to the general contractors who intend to bid for the prime contract on a public or private
construction job. 04 Normally depositories are only used for large
construction projects, and seldom are used for home construction
jobs. Also, depositories seem to be used more frequently in the mechanical, painting and electrical trades than any others.
A "locked box" procedure is the most common method of depository operation. 10 5 Subcontractors wishing to bid to one or more general contractors on a certain job submit bids in sealed envelopes to
the depository. An envelope containing a bid addressed to each general contractor to whom the subcontractor wishes to bid is placed in
the "locked box," and another envelope containing a copy of that
bid is addressed to the depository itself and similarly deposited in
the box or another secure receptacle. There will be a cut-off point,
typically 4 hours or so before the prime bid opening time (i.e., the
time by which all bids must be submitted to the owner or awarding
authority), and after that cut-off point (or depository closing time)
is reached, no more bids may be received, and none received may be
amended or withdrawn.
Promptly at the depository closing time, the locked box is
opened, and the envelopes contained therein are dispensed to the general contractors to whom addressed. Each general contractor then
prepares his own bid to the owner or awarding authority based upon
the subbids received and his estimates of his own work costs.
The "locked box" operation is intended to permit more orderly
preparation of bids and estimates by providing a reasonable time for
computations, thereby reducing error, and to inhibit practices known
Schueller, supra note 102, at 507.
Schueller, supra note 102, at 498. Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 231,
234 n.20. Also, see generally Panel Discussion "Contracting in Compliance
with Anti-trust Laws," National Electrical Contractors Ass'n, Las Vegas,
Nevada, May 4, 1965.
105 Indeed, the "locked box" may be an essential ingredient of a bid depository, for other schemes not using the locked box are usually called a bid
registry.
103

104
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as "bid shopping," "bid peddling," and "bid chiseling.' 10 6 These terms
find no common definition in the industry and are used interchangeably to describe the practice of a subcontractor who submits a lower
bid to a general contractor than the known bids previously submitted
to the general by the sub or any of his competitors, in return for
assurance from the general that the sub will receive the subcontract if
the general is the successful prime bidder. The terms also refer to the
reverse situation where the general contractor discloses his current
low bid and seeks an undercutting of that bid by one or more subs
anxious to receive the award. Those practices can and frequently
do result in lower bids to the general, who will then seek to maximize
his chance of winning the prime bid by lowering his bid to the owner
or awarding authority. These terms are also used to refer to the activity that occurs after the award of the prime bid to a general, when
the general, secure in his position, attempts to "chisel" down subcontractors' bids to figures lower than that used by the general in
preparing his already successful prime bid. Whatever may be the
industry view of the ethics of such practices, the fact remains that
"shopping," "peddling" and "chiseling" represent price competition in
its purest form.
To insure proper operation, and to achieve their goals, depositories usually must develop a comprehensive set of rules, with sanctions such as fines or expulsion imposed for violation of the rules.
Although bid depositories are commonly run by subcontractors'
trade associations, it is not uncommon to find general contractors
participating as directors of a depository. Usually, depositories are
open to use by any subcontractor in the applicable trade, even
though he is not a member of the trade association, but membership in
the depository itself is often required before a subcontractor may use
the facilities. Depositories are typically open to use by all general
contractors desiring to bid on a particular project, and sometimes
"membership" in the depository by the general is required. Usually
only an agreement to adhere to depository rules is required.
Most bid depositories have rules or bylaws which include provi10 7
sions containing generally the following:
1. No subcontractor using the depository for one or more bids
may bid to a general contractor except through the depository; in
other words, subs must use the depository exclusively or not at all.
Additionally, member subcontractors are usually required to use the
depository if possible.
2. No general contractor using the depository to receive bids may
106 Schueller, supra note 102, at 498; cf. Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository v. Christiansen, 352 F.2d 817, 818 (10th Cir. 1965).
107 See, e.g., rules and bylaws in cases cited note 117 infra.
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accept a bid from a subcontractor except through the depository; in
other words, generals must use the depository exclusively or not at
all. (Some depositories do permit a general to accept bids from
"outside" subs, but only if the general places the bid in the depository
himself and pays any applicable fees-if the outside sub's bid is the
low bid of all those in the depository, only then may it be used by
the general.)
3. The general contractor, if the successful prime bidder, must
award the subcontract for each trade to the low bidder in the depository, if any bids were received from the depository in that trade.
4. Depository fees are based on a percentage of the bid price,
frequently with minimum and maximum dollar amounts, and are
therefore not directly related to the depository's expenses in handling
bids on a particular project.
These provisions clearly and plainly violate the antitrust laws, as
will be seen from the authorities presented below.
The law of the United States regarding the organizational features of bid depositories is clearly and authoritatively pronounced by
0
Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository v. Christiansen.'
In this
case, plaintiff Christiansen, a subcontractor formerly a member of
the defendant depository, sought damages and injunctive relief
under sections 1, 2 and 15 of the Sherman Act. 0 9 The district court
held for plaintiff, and the Court of -Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Three specific depository rules were considered, and held
unlawful: Rule V, which provided that general contractors using
depository facilities may only accept bids received through the depository; Rule III, which prohibited "bid splitting"; and Rule VIII, which
was a prohibition on late bids for 90 days, without a 25 percent revision in specifications. The court held that the cumulative effect of
these three rules provided the antitrust violation. Both the district
court and the court of appeals indicated that Rule V alone would be
per se violation of the antitrust laws, but did not need to decide that
point.": 0 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
I The law in California is equally clear.I" Recent California cases
under the State antitrust laws, which laws are consistent with the
Sherman Act and authorities thereunder, are in agreement with the
Christiansenresult." 2 In People v. Inland Bid Depository,"i3 an ap108 352 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966).
But cf.
United States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc., 1958
Trade Cas. 69,087, 1959 Trade Cas. 69,266 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
109 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 15 (1964).
110 352 F.2d at 819 n.5; 230 F. Supp. at 189-90.
III CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-758.
312 People v. Building Maintenance Contractors Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 719, 264
P.2d 31 (1953).
"13 233 Cal. App. 2d 851, 44 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1965).
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pellate court squarely held illegal a rule which provided for a bid
depository closing time of basically 4 hours before any prime bid
closing time. Also struck down were rules that a subcontractor using
the depository may not bid to a general contractor who does not use
the depository; that a general contractor must himself put into the
depository any bid received from an outside subcontractor and himself pay the depository fee if that bid is the successful subbid; and
finally a rule that a general contractor may not bid in his own name
and then sublet the work to anyone other than the lower bidder in
14
the depository."
Inland Bid has produced several important results. First, it has
been referred to as establishing clearly that California adheres to the
doctrine of per se illegality of group boycotts. 1 5 Second, the Attorney General of California, resting his opinion on Inland Bid, has
warned all bid depositories to amend their rules to conform to that
case." 6 Third, two superior courts have held illegal per se rules
similar to those considered in Inland Bid and Christiansen."7 Finally,
the Attorney General has advised the State Office of Architecture
and Construction that it not only has the power but would be acting
in accordance with the antitrust laws in requiring all general contractors to include in their bids an affidavit that none of the bids
obtained from subcontractors were obtained through a bid depository.

1 8

114
"15

Id.

People v. Santa Clara Valley Bowling Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 225, 47
Cal. Rptr. 570 (1965).
116 Letter signed for Thomas Lynch, Attorney General, by Wallace
Howland, Assistant Attorney General, to all bid depositories, July 1, 1966.
"17 Carl N. Swenson Co. v. E.C. Braun Co., Civil No. 182040 (Super. Ct.
Santa Clara Co., Calif., filed Jan. 4, 1967); Oakland-Alameda Builders' Exch.
v. F.P. Lathrop Constr. Co., Civil No. 362866 (Super. Ct. Alameda Co., Calif.,
filed Sept. 5, 1967). In the memorandum opinion filed by Judge Lercara in
the latter case he said:

"[Tihe rules of the .

.

. Oakland-Alameda County

Builders' Exchange... are definitely in violation of the Cartwright Act and
the Sherman Antitrust Act under the Inland Bid case."
118 Letter from Thomas Lynch, Attorney General, signed by Iver E.
Skjeie, Deputy Attorney General, to Emil Relat, Chief Counsel, Department
of General Services, Sept. 6, 1967, in which the Attorney General said:
"Because there is no express or implied prohibition against the Department's proposal and since the implementation thereof would not only be
consistent with the antitrust depository holdings but also consistent with the
implementation of the competitive bidding system, it is our opinion that if
the Department wishes as a matter of policy to do so it may legally include
the proposed certification requirement.
"The proposed certification reads as follows: 'The bidder states that in
the preparation of this bid no bid was received by bidder from a bid depository which depository as to any portion of the work prohibits or imposes
sanctions for the obtaining by bidder or the submission to bidder by any subcontractor or vendor or supplier of goods and services of a bid -outside the bid
depository.'"
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If then, a depository, with fines or other sanctions employed, has
the typical rule that subcontractors and general contractors using
the depository must use it exclusively, then a boycott, illegal per se,
has occurred. 119 The anticompetitive impact is not lessened substantially by the gesture of permitting a general contractor to receive bids from outside subs if the general agrees to put those bids
into the depository himself.
There seems to be no valid purpose to be served by requiring a
general contractor to award subcontracts to the low bidder through a
depository. Even if a rule-of-reason type argument were permitted
as justification for such a requirement, this rule fails to withstand the
test of reason. Any desired check on general contractors can be had
merely by requiring that some bid tendered through the depository
be accepted, not necessarily the low bid. Price alone is frequently
not the only factor in a general's choice of a responsible subcontractor,
for such other factors as location, experience, solvency, union or
nonunion work force, as well as personal friendships or preferences,
would often be considered in the making of an unfettered choice.
Similarly, depository fees, which are eventually added to the
contract price, violate a rule-of-reason analysis when those fees are
unrelated to the services rendered in exchange therefor, but instead
are merely percentages of the bid price.
In summary, what is a bid depository? It is a combination of
competitors, frequently with great market power, which has as its
avowed purpose the restraining of price competition, and which exerts
influence on its members and on others to refuse to deal with those
who do not adhere to its goals. In short, a bid depository is pricefixing enforced by boycotting.
Some Guidelines for Trade Association

Members and Executives
It is of little moment to assert loudly and repeatedly that trade
associations, because of their importance to the economy and to our
way of life, must be "protected." No one questions the importance of
the trade association in the modern business world, nor the extent of
its influence, nor the ease with which it can be used, if permitted, by
members and trade association executives to violate the antitrust
laws. What is important is that trade association members and execu119 Even if, as was suggested in Note, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 231, 235-36 (1965),
the rules be construed as a mere exclusive dealing agreement, the usual
economic power of depositories and the likelihood that member subcontractors
will indeed boycott "outside" generals should establish the illegality of such
rules under the rule of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949);
cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 325-29 (1961).

January 1968]

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS

tives alike not only should recognize and understand the applicability
of antitrust principles as a standard of conduct of trade association
activities, but also should keep under constant and critical review
and evaluation the activities of the association, to make certain that
they do not run afoul of the increasingly strict standards.
Particular attention should be paid to the general subject of
membership meetings. The need for such meetings should be carefully scrutinized, for membership meetings are traditionally looked
upon as an instrumentality through which trade association conspiracies are conceived and developed. Antitrust implications exist in almost every aspect of such a meeting. Trade association meetings,
therefore, should be held only as often as discussions are needed on
legitimate topics of benefit to the industry. 120 It is inevitable when
persons engaged in the same industry meet together that they discuss
matters of importance to them in the industry, none of which is more
121
important than price.
Under no condition should members be forced to take part in
22
trade association activities, including attendance at meetings.'
Members should freely admit to their trade association qualified applicants upon nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. All business decisions should be made unilaterally and not as a result of joint action
taken as a result of a trade association meeting.
Preparation of the agenda for meetings is very important because
trade-restraining topics must be kept off that agenda and must not be
discussed. Discussion of production, market, price statistics, merchandising methods and standardization are among the topics to
which antitrust risk attaches. If any of these topics are to be discussed, a careful outline should be agreed upon by the chairman and
the principal discussants. Minutes of the meetings should summarize
the discussion and report accurately all action taken. Brevity (but
not at the expense of accuracy) is desirable.
Finally, members should be scrupulously careful in and out of
meetings, on social occasions and in the office, to refrain so far as is
humanly possible from discussing, even in jest, any common industry problems relating directly or indirectly to any of the antitrust
guidelines which have been erected by antitrust enforcement of the
past.
120

See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377

(1921).
121 Antitrust enforcement agencies are prone to believe Adam Smith's
oft-quoted, if ancient, statement that: "People of the same trade seldom
meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends
in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."

A. SMrTH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 102 (1883).
122

Cf. United States v. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
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Trade associations, boycott-prone though they may be, are im portant, useful and essential to the efficient, effective and ever-changing operation of our capitalistic economy, and they can and will grow
in size and in number. They will prosper so long as their members
and executives operate independently within the antitrust guidelines.

